Differentia: Review of Italian Thought
Number 1 Autumn

Article 14

1986

The Seductiveness of Literature
Giuseppe Sertoli

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia

Recommended Citation
Sertoli, Giuseppe (1986) "The Seductiveness of Literature," Differentia: Review of Italian Thought: Vol. 1 ,
Article 14.
Available at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia/vol1/iss1/14

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Academic Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Differentia: Review of Italian Thought by an authorized editor of Academic Commons. For more
information, please contact mona.ramonetti@stonybrook.edu, hu.wang.2@stonybrook.edu.

The Seductiveness
of Literature

Giuseppe Sertoli

On n'ecrit pas pour se montrer;
on ecrit pour disparaftre.
-B. Pinguad
PROLOGUE

My presence here to talk about the seductiveness of literature
is itself probably an effect-however distorted-of seduction, insofar as I felt no particular desire to do so, having never previously
even thought of speaking or writing about such a subject. Yet as
soon as it was suggested to me I felt somehow "taken." And this is
precisely how seduction works; as Baudrillard says, there is never a
subject which desires an object, but rather an object which captures
a subject. 1
This essay was the keynote address to the VT National Congress of the
Associazione Italian di Anglistica (A. I.A.) held in Pavia, October 22-24, 1983; it
has been published in the Proceedings: T. Kemeny, L. Guerra, and A. Baldry
(eds .), Letteratura& DiscourseAnalysis (Schena: Fasano di Puglia, 1984), pp . 25-42.

[Translatedfrom the Italian by Anne B. McLaughlin]
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What was it then that captured me in this suggestion? I would
say quite simply the chance I was being offered to reflect for a
moment (naturally, with all the subjectiveness which this entails
and which I would like to state right from the start) upon something which in our daily work as critics, historians, teachers (alas!)
of literature we almost always tend to ignore, that is, the appeal or,
if we prefer, the seductiveness which literature exerts upon us - as
readers first and foremost, and only secondly as critics, historians,
teachers, etc.
A proof of what I have just said, somewhat casual perhaps but
no less symptomatic, could be found in the symposium "Professing Literature" which the Times Literary Supplement published
about a year ago (10/12/1982).In this symposium all the participants
discussed critical methods, authors' canons, academic curricula ,
etc., without anyone'sever asking what a reader looks for in literature, what he finds (or doesn't find), in other words, why he reads.
And yet there would be no methods or canons, or teachers or
students (not even congresses such as this) if no one read, that is to
say if no one, at some time or another, had ever been seduced by
literature. It is this seduction, this experience of literature, which
constitutes the presupposition for every subsequent discussion
aboutliterature. It is a kind of primal scene which we are constantly
reliving even if we do not refer to it in our daily work, even if we can
forget it or refuse to acknowledge it- a kind of indelible "residue"
which never ceases to accompany us and perhaps at times to
disturb us.
What enticed me about the suggestion made by my friends on
the Committe e was, then, the chance to approach this difficult and
tenebrous core of literature. And when I began asking myself what
angle I should approach it from, the only plausible answer seemed
to be from the point of view of reading; because it is in reading that
literature works its charm and its seduction on us; it is the form
which gives us our original experience of it. My talk will therefore
be a talk about reading.
1. READING

I will take as my starting point Ruskin's lecture Of Kings'

Treasuries(1864) which, as you know, is about reading.
There ar e two metaphors, apparently antithetical but in fact
homologous, which dominate Ruskin's talk. The first compares
reading to a social act, to "talk." Reading, says Ruskin, is talking
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with those "friends" who are the authors of the books. As Descartes had already said two hundred years earlier, "Reading a good
book is like talking with those very great men of former centuries
who were the authors." 2
In fact, the term "talk" seems inappropriate. Talking involves
an exchange of communication between someone who speaks (in
this case, the author) and someone who replies (the reader). It
always implies a dual relationship and it requires both parties to
participate equally actively (even if perhaps at different levels).
This, however, is not what Ruskin intends. His "friend" is a
teacher, and the communication is one-way: the reader must simply listen silently to the voice of the author. Ruskin repeats this
several times: the reader must not add anything of his own to what
the author says; he must not allow his own thoughts and words to
interfere with the author's. The reading relationship is therefore
univocal: the reader must remain passive before the author, particularly since in the author's voice it is the voice of Truth itself
("Nature's dictation" 3 ) that speaks. The reader's silence is the
required condition for receiving the author's message, and the
transparency of the reader before the author is doubled in the
author's transparency before Truth. (This is what Proust rightly
calls Ruskin's "Platonism.")
Ruskin goes on to add a second metaphor for reading: reading,
he says, is a type of work like that of "Australian miners." The
truth which the reader extracts from a book is the gold which the
miner digs out of a mine.
Initially, this latter metaphor does not seem to accord with the
former one. Not only because reading is shown as a solitary act, but
above all because it is shown as an activity. To dig out gold, freeing
it from the rock which imprisons it, we need spades, shovels and
picks, or rather the "care, wit and learning" of the reader. If the
book is a message of Truth, reading it will be a deciphering more or
less lengthy and difficult, according to how cryptic the inscribed
Truth is.
When we look more closely, however, this second metaphor
can accord with the first. The excavation involved in reading is by
no means an interpretation of the Truth. The gold-like the "wisdom" of the friend-teacher-is
there, it is given once and for all
and it only requires to be brought to the light by breaking away the
rock which imprisons it. "Rocks," for Ruskin, are the words in
which the "thoughts," or rather the "intention" of the author has
been deposited 4; but "rock" is also everything which constitutes a
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screen for the reader, separating him from the gold. If the reader
has to chip away at something, therefore, it is himself. In breaking
up the rock, he will indeed use his "equipment" of care, wit and
learning, but he will use it against himself, so to speak-until the
moment when he has used it all up and he finds himself barehanded before the gold. In fact, he will find itin his hands-and he
will come out of the mine with it, returning to the world a rich man ,
just as the disciple came back from a talk with the master bringing
that "wisdom" he had acquired from him.
The metaphor of the mine, however, is significant above all for
the way it represents the experience of reading. Reading is selfsegregation. Like the miner, the reader leaves behind him the
"outside world": other men, his place among them, his own (old)
ego. Certainly, he leaves them behind to find them again, to
recreate them by re-forming them differently from before (what
better symbol of transformation than gold?). But is all this true?
Will the miner really be able to come out of the mine with the gold?
At a certain point in Ruskin's lecture, there is an astonishing
passage. Wishing to distinguish what he calls "books of the hour"
from those which he calls "books of all time," he says that the
difference lies in the fact that, while the intention of the former is
"communication," that of the latter is "permanence." The "book of
the hour" is nothing more than the amplification - the "multiplication" and the "conveyance"-of
the voice of the author, who
writes it (in the same way as he writes a letter) only because he
cannot reach all his (potential) listeners with the spoken word: if he
could, he would not write. 5 On the other hand, the " book of all
time" -which Ruskin calls the only true Book-is differen t because "it is essentially not a talking thing, but a written thing. " 6
Now, what does this mean?
One answ er comes to mind immediately. Ruskin, in the manner of Horace and Johnson, is contrasting the lasting with the
ephemeral. The "book of the hour" is ephemeral because it is poor
and can be immediately deciphered, and therefore the communication between it and the reader is very quickly exhausted; the "book
of all time" (the Book of Truth!), on the contrary, is lasting because
it is rich and th erefore requires a long, indeed infinit e effort on the
part of the reader to decipher it.
This is, however, a banal answer which confines itself to a
conception of the book (and of reading) as communication , and
this does not correspond to Ruskin's own idea in this particular
passage. In fact, after reserving the term "communication" for the
"book of the hour" and defining the "book of all time" as "not a
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talking thing but a written thing," he adds that it is very difficult to
understand it because the author cannot express all his thought
there. Indeed, even more strange, he doesnot wish to, either, choosing to express it "in a hidden way and in parables." "I cannot quite
see the reason of this," adds Ruskin, "nor analyse that cruel reticence in the breasts of wise men which makes them always hide
their deeper thought. " 7
This is frankly an astonishing admission. First of all, reading is
presented to us - following the communicative example of
conversation-as
listening to words; now, instead, these same
words are being presented as reticent, indeed as an explicit, voluntary refusal to communicate. And such a refusal appears to be
intrinsic to writing, constitutive of the very act of writing. To write
is not to wish to communicate, or at least to remove something from
communication. But what is the reason for this? Ruskin's answer is
to some extent obvious: because "wisdom" is a reward which the
reader must deserve. Gold can only be the recompense for the
efforts made to find it. But it is clear that the question simply
repeats itself: why must the gold be sought in this way? Why,
instead, can it not be freely offered, donated? And here Ruskin has
no reply-except to refer to the inscrutable laws of Nature. 8
It is surely easy to imagine the direction which a discussion
starting from this sentence of Ruskin's could and should take. It is
the direction which has been followed, in the twentieth century, by
a certain philosophical current, from Heidegger to Levinas, from
Blanchot to Derrida right up to the recent book by Giorgio Agamben, II linguaggioe la morte,9 which has questioned the status of
writing in its relations with language and with what we usually call
(what Ruskin at any rate called) "Truth." (Needless to say, this was
a question which lay beyond Ruskin's possibilities, so that in the
end he was obliged to admit that he "did not understand.")
I do not intend, however, to take this direction. I will instead
keep, as I have done up to now, to the most superficial level of
reading. At this level, Ruskin's lecture (undoubtedly going beyond
and perhaps despite its author's intentions) brings us to an unexpected conclusion: the descent into the mine, which the act of
reading consists of, may perhaps not bring to the light the gold
which is to be found there, but may rather lead to the darkness of a
rock which remains (as Nietzsche said) to some extent unbreakable, impenetrable. What had initially seemed like the silence of the
reader listening to th e voice of Truth, now appears to be a silence
which, at least partly, sinks into another silence: the author's
refusal to speak, and, behind this, the invisibility of a Truth which
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(if it exists) is neven given entirely, neither to be known nor to be
communicated.
As we know, Ruskin's lecture was translated into French by
Proust, who accompanied it with a long preface and even longer
notes. 10 Proust immediately rejects Ruskin's equation reading=
talking. Reading a book, he says, is not like talking to a friend; and
the difference does not lie so much in the greater or lesser "wisdom" of one or the other, as in the different type of communication
which they give rise to. Reading, says Proust, is "communicating
in the bosom of solitude" and books, "the work of solitude," are
the "children of silence" -"children"
who have nothing in common with the "children of the word." 11 Unlike conversation, reading
consists for each of us in receiving the communication of another
thought, while nevertheless remaining alone, that is, continuing to
enjoy the intellectual power one has in solitude and which talking
often dissolves, continuing to be able to be inspired, to remain in the
full and fertile work of the spirit on itself. 12

The difference between Ruskin's (first) type of reading, a
public and social act, and Proust's, a private and solitary act, is
obvious here. But it is not conclusive. After all, it was Ruskin
himself who compared reading to a descent into a mine. The real
divergence lies in Proust's rejection of Ruskin's "Platonism." Truth
is not something already established outside of ourselves and
which we must simply come into possession of-the wisdom of
the friend-master, the gold of the mine-but
rather something
which we must find inside ourselves, indeed produceby ourselves.
Thus Proust says that the experience of reading is an experience of
"intellectual strength," of "fertile work of the spirit on itself," and
in another passage he adds that the reader "develops his ego"
thanks precisely to solitude and in it. 13 Here we see the distance
between Proust and Ruskin: for Proust, the work in the mine is not
a dissolving of the ego, on the contrary, it is a strengthening of it.
The gold is not found but produced. If the written word (and
therefore neither for Proust the spoken word) allows the reader to
attune himself to the voice of the author, 14 that tuning is also what
will allow him to find his own voice- which will allow him, therefore, to become an author himself. As Roland Barthes rightly
noted, reading for Proust is-and must be-an inducement to
writing. 15
On the other hand, throughout these pages of Proust, there is
also an insistent warning of a danger in reading. "Reading lies on
the threshold of spiritual life; it can lead us to it, it does not
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constitute it." The book is "the angel which flies away as soon as
the gates of the celestial garden are opened." Reading is dangerous
if, instead of "giving us the use" of our spiritual activity, it becomes
a substitute for it. Then "stillness" takes over from "exaltation,"
the "principle of death" from the "principle of life," and that Truth
which can only be drawn out of ourselves, created by ourselves, is
sought outside, like a "material thing placed between the leaves of
a book," a treasure already given which we have only to appropriate. 16
This is certainly still part of the anti-Platonic argument; but
there is more, which Proust does not dwell upon, which I, on the
contrary, would like to emphasize-which,
in fact, I will take as the
leading thread of my talk.
In a lecture on the education of young girls, Of Queens' Gardens
(1864), which was also translated and commented upon by Proust,
Ruskin condemned the "sore temptation of novel reading": "The
best romance," he wrote, "becomes dangerous if, by its excitement, it renders the ordinary course of life uninteresting, and
increases the morbid thirst for useless acquaintance with scenes in
which we shall never be called upon to act.'' 17 This is an old cliche
which even in Ruskin's time had more than a century of history
behind it (Coleridge had said that girls' reading of eighteenthcentury novels was just a form of daydreaming). However, it is
worth underscoring the last words quoted, "scenes in which we
shall never be called upon to act." When Ruskin denies that reading novels can be educational for women, insofar as what a woman
looks for (and finds) in them is only "food" for her "inborn disposition" to fantasy, 18 he is not simply repeating a commonplace on
feminine identity; instead he is saying that reading seduces to the
extent that, by removing the reader (the female reader!} from the
"ordinary course of life," it leads to an imaginary world and identity. Reading (novels) is losing oneself to reality by losing oneself to
oneself.
It is precisely this oblivion and this loss which Proust shies
away from in reading. His whole discussion is intended to
state-with
a still quite Romantic fervor (as can be seen in the
recurrence of such terms as "inspiration," "creation," "genius,"
etc.)-that
reading (and particularly the reading of novels) is a
process of appropriation and not of expropriation of the self. What
Proust resists and reacts against is the possibility that reading
might be the devil of night who brings darkness into the daylight
rather than the angel of night who brings light into the darkness.
And yet, what if in fact this were the effect produced by
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reading, the seduction that literature exerts? If, through/beyondthe
imaginary in which reality dissolves itself, it were that annulment
of the self and of the world, rooted in an "inertia of the will," in an
"impossibility to wish" that for Proust is a sickness, one which
reading should cure by strengthening the self? If what the reader
seeks within the space of a book were not the splendor of an ego
but, on the contrary, the obscuring of "every sentiment and memory," like "that gentleman who, having lived from his earliest
youth with street brigands, could no longer remember his own
name because he had stopped using it for such a long time"? 19

2. THE SECRET

Ruskin and Proust have given a series of indications, sometimes convergent, sometimes divergent, which should now be tied
together. Then we may try to define the effects of the seduction
that literature exerts through reading.
Etymologically, "to seduce" means "to divert," "to lead
aside." If literature seduces, therefore, it is because it diverts the
reader from what is nothing other than what Ruskin had called
"the ordinary course of life" and Freud, more synthetically, "reality." Reading is where this leading aside, this abduction takes
place. Ruskin tells us so in his image of the mine, as does Proust not
only in his insistence on solitude but in his list of places for reading:
the shade of a tree in a deserted field, an empty room, the bedroom
at night. ... These are experiences we have all had and we could
add an infinity of others: for example, that during childhood we
often read secretly, that equally often we are possessive about what
we read: we do not like to talk about it, we hate to be caught in the
act of reading, etc. Reading is an "asocial" experience (Barthes),
"claustrophilic" (a term recently proposed by Elvio Fachinelli), 20
which segregates us from the world and from other people-but
also, we have begun to see, from ourselves. In a word, we might
say that it is a movement toward secrecy, toward the space of a
secret.
Such a movement would seem to be governed by two tendencies which I will call imaginaryappropriationof the self and the world
and expropriationof the self and the world.
Starting from the first, I will rather liberally make use of two
different theories: Lacan's famous study of the mirror stage, and
some other psychoanalytic studies on secrecy and secrets which
have appeared relatively recently. 21
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Given that all psychoanalysts who have studied the secret
(understood as the act of hiding [oneself in] something, not as what
is hidden) agree in considering it an indispensable element in the
mental constitution and organization of the subject, how do they
represent it? The answer is simple: by comparing it to a treasure.
Hiding is storing treasures. But what does one hide, and why?
One hides above all, obviously, beloved objects which the
subject stores as treasures to preserve them from appropriation by
others, from the wear and tear of time, from loss in everyday life. It
may be a gift, a letter, any very ordinary material object; or it may
be a thought, a memory, an image, which becomes invisible by not
speaking about it, not communicating it. But at the same time what
the subject hides and treasures is a part of the self, the part bound
to those beloved objects and which the subject feels as his own true
identity, his own true self. 22
As for why one hides oneself by hiding something, an English
psychoanalyst (M. Masud R. Khan) has said that the subject "absents himself" (A. Green) in the secret not only to preserve his own
self from a traumatic reality, but to keep it "suspended." The
"secret('s) space," in other words, is a "potential space" (Winnicott) where the subject preserves those nuclei of mental experiences which he does not yet have the capacity to actualize in the
real world: he keeps them in the hope of being able to actualize
them one day when he will (re-)emerge as a complete person in the
world of (other) men. The secret, like a casket, guards the subject's
identity in a utopian expectation of being able to give back to the
sociality of real life. 2 3
Let us compare what we have just seen with reading as it was
presented, indeed recommended, by Ruskin and, above all,
Proust. The correspondences are immediately clear. Precisely since
it is solitary (self-hiding), reading allows the subject to go down
into those "deep regions of the self" where "the true life of the
spirit begins" 24 : where, by thinking "by himself," he can find and
develop those forces which will make him an individual a part
entiere:a "creator," says Proust. 25 For Proust too, then, the "secret('s)
space" is a potential space: by absenting himself in that "suspended animation" 26 which is reading, the subject preserves and
indeed matures his own virtualities. To read is to be born, or rather
to be continually reborn. By segregating the ego, reading reconstitutes it again each time other than what it was . (Obviously, Ruskin's metaphor of the gold and the mine says nothing different
from this.)
However, this conclusion overlooks, in my opinion, an essential aspect of the secret. The process of segregation is a process of
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transformation into fantasies. What is hidden (treasured) is transformed into something (a treasure) imaginary. Any common
phenomenology can confirm it. The more the beloved object is
made and kept secret, the more it will lose its real characteristics to
take on others which are purely imaginary. At the same time, that
part of the self which the subject hides with the beloved object
becomes imaginary too. If it is his true identity, his true ego, this
identity and this ego are nothing more than a fantasy. Un leurre,
Lacan would say.
The imaginary, in fact-as Lacan himself teaches-is voue au
leurre:to illusion and deceit (and therefore to disillusion and undeceive). We can think back to one of the most frequently recurring
themes in fairy-tales: a safe is opened, and instead of gold coins,
stones or pieces of coal are found; a locket is opened, and instead of
the lock of hair , a little heap of dust is found. Now, what else can
this mean except that the treasure was imaginary - and that th ere
is no way of converting the imaginary into the real? This is not all:
the subject who discovers such a thing often goes mad. After
having been closed inside the safe or the locket, his ego is dissolved
when these are opened, finding himself without an ego. Again,
there is no passage from the imaginary to the real. Segregation is
irreversible. What has been closed in the "potential space" of the
secret can never come out of it to be actualized in the real world.
The utopia of the imaginary is truly a u-topia: something which can
dwell nowhere but can only rest on itself: a pure and absolute
fantasy.
If the angel of reading, as Proust said, opens the gates of the
celestial garden, it must be the garden of the imaginary; and if the
reader's ego lives in it, this same ego is by now no more than an
imaginary ego. As Barthes wrote, "the subject-reader is a subject
entirely transferred into the register of the Imaginary." 27 And it is
Proust himself who confirms for us that this register is not convertible, reversible into the register of the Real: because that identity
which he found in the silence and the solitude of reading is not his
own identity, but Marcel's, such as will be presented in the
Recherche.One passes from reading to writing, from one imaginary
setting to another, without ever being able to come out and to
return to the "world outside."
It is here, then, that Lacan's theory of the mirror stage can help
us. The essential point of this theory is well-known: between the
age of six and eighteen months, when he is still in a state of motor
unco -ordination and functional fragmentation, the child who is
placed in front of a mirror perceives himself as a whole form
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(Gestalt). That is, he perceives in the image the mirror sends him
and in which he recognizes himself, that corporal unity, that functional synthesis which he does not actually have but which,
through such means, he is able to anticipate imaginatively. The
child identifies himself with his mirror-image, and this comes to
constitute for him the primordial form of what will one day be his
"function as subject," the unity and the permanence of his ego (je).
But such an identification is also, immediately, an alienation. The
figure which is shown in the mirror is other than the child, so that
by identifying himself with that, he identifies with the other of
himself. At the same time, then, that the image provides the child
with the symbolic matrix of subjectivity, it provides him with it as
an object (moi) placed "in a fictional direction": an "Ideal -I"
("ideal," like that corporal unity which the child in his real "poverty" lacks) which constitutes an imaginary goal toward which the
subject will never cease to stretch out, alienating himself in it. 28
This experience of the mirror is exactly the same as the experi ence of reading. "Populated solitude," Proust called it: populated
by figures, by images. Things, people, places, feelings, actions ...
the whole of reality, reflected in the pages of a book, of books, is
exhibited like a spectacle before the reader's eyes. And when the
reader sees it, he recognizes it, that is, he identifies with it and
alienates himself in it at the same time. I need not mention the
identification processes which occur in reading. Whatever their
form, it is always a projection of the subject who is reading into an
"Ideal-I" which is the pole around which the work's entire imaginary universe is arranged. The child's recognition of himself in his
mirror -image, writes Lacan,
immediately rebounds [ ... ] in a series of gestures in which he
experiences in play the relation between the movements ass1;1medin
the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual
complex and the reality it reduplicates-the
child's own body, and
the persons and things around him. 29

By taking possession of himself imaginatively, the child takes
possession imaginatively of the world (his world). But as this world
is also other than the real world, the child will alienate himself in it
in the same way as he alienated in the other ego which the mirror
sends back to him. The same thing happens with the reader: by
coinciding with the imaginary ego provided by the text, he makes
his world coincide with this equally imaginary world of the text.
The pleasure of reading (which is something different from
Barthes's "pleasure of the text") is therefore the "jubilation" of
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Lacan's child in front of the mirror: it is the jubilation-or
the
"euphoria" (Barthes)-of the transfer to an ego and an imaginary
world which leads the subject to believe that at last he possesses
himself and reality. Qubilation and euphoria in which psychoanalysts will easily trace the dream of infantile omnipotence
and its narcissism.)
Ruskin, therefore, was right: segregation in the mine is aimed
at finding gold: the gold of the imaginary. But precisely because it is
so it cannot be carried out of the mine: it is a treasure only as long
as it stays in the mine. I repeat, there is no exit from the
1magmary.
But here we must ask: is it necessarily true that we want to
come out? Further still: is it really the gold we are looking for when
we go into the mine? Or is it that we go in only in order not to come
out again? Is not the gold only the lure which draws us into the
mine, the alibi which we give ourselves for going in, at the most the
"secondary gain" (Freud) which we obtain from it-whereas deep
down what we are seeking is something else? In short, is not the
reader Rosso Malpelo rather than Ali Baba?*
Let us go back to the secret. The psychoanalysts who have
studied it are ready to recognize that it is ambivalent: it can be a
treasure, but it can also be a guilt feeling or a disgrace. Curiously
enough, however, after having mentioned this, they go on to
speak of it always and only as a treasure, never as a guilt feeling or a
disgrace.
Now, it is clear that this second value of the secret puts us in a
completely different perspective. A guilt feeling or a disgrace is
hidden not to be treasured but to be destroyed. We keep quiet
about it, we make it invisible not because we want to preserve it but
because we want to make it disappear. Nor do we wish it to remain
out of sight only from other people, but also from ourselves. It
should no longer exist even for us, even as a memory or an image.
This is to say that we do not want to remember it, but to forget it.
(The fact that guilt or disgrace remains as an indelible memory
which keeps coming back to torment the subject is something
against which he will never stop struggling.) This means, however, that it is the subject himself who wishes to forget himself. Far
from guarding a part of himself in the secret, he rubs out this part,
he suppresses it. "He carried his secret with him to the grave" is a
*Rosso Malpelo is the main character of the homonymous short story by G.
Verga, published in the volume Vitadei campi (1880). Rosso never returns from his
exploration of the cave. [Tr.]
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common expression: it is like saying that the secret was alreadythe
grave in which the subject had buried himself.
Now, this annulment of the self is the second and more profound goal of reading. More profound, I say, than the goal of the
imaginary. Psychoanalysts draw an accurate distinction between
"secret" and "fantasy." The fantasy is the signifier of a signified
which remains unsaid. In every subject, fantasy production is a
series of mobile and changing scenes which refer to an "other
scene" -the secret-which, immobile and always identical to itself, remains invisible. Masks of a face which they hide. If the secret
is an unspoken word, no other word can take its place, can translate it-and by translating, reveal the secret. On the contrary,
every (other) word, every image or fantasy cannot help but refer to
the secret and annul itself in it-just as masks are annulled in the
face which gives the lie to them. 30
The relationship between fantasy and secret is the relationship
which runs between the two tendencies and goals of reading. If the
segregation from the real is supposed to achieve an imaginary
appropriation of the self and of the world, what the subject is
looking for-or rather, what he is seduced by-through/beyond
such appropriation is the expropriation of the self and of the world.
Not the identification with an imaginary ego, but the effacement of
the ego. Beyond the fantasies lies the secret. What seduces us in
literature - in the etymological sense of the word, what diverts us
from ourselves-is the promise of that loss. The imaginary is only a
lure and a transition. The gold which attracts us into the mine is the
"call" (leurre) which induces us to go in; but what we are really
looking for, what we have been seduced by, is the mine itself. As
the Narcissus myth illustrates so exemplarily: because what he
really desired, beneath the image of himself which was drawn on
the surface of the water (his imaginary ego), was the bottom of the
pool. The imaginary is the call of death.
Proust was right, then, when, fearing reading, he said that it is
scored by a dangerous "principle of death" which wishes and
looks for "stillness." In Beyond the PleasurePrinciple (1920) Freud
introduced a new principle called the "Nirvana principle," which
was borrowed from an English psychoanalyst and, earlier, obviously, from Schopenhauer. With it, Freud was referring to the
tendency of the psyche "to reduce, [ ... ] to eliminate the internal
tension caused by stimuli." 31 In this text, Freud identified the
Nirvana principle with the pleasure principle itself, in that he
considered that pleasure could not be anything other than the
opposite of tension. Four years later, in his essay "The Economic
Problem of Masochism," he would seem to have changed this
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view, contrasting the pleasure principle, representative of the
libido, to the Nirvana principle, defined as "entirely in the service
of the death instincts, whose aim is to conduct the restlessness of
life into the stability of the inorganic state" and whose function it is
to preserve the organism from "the demands of the life instincts."32
It is precisely under the sign of stillness and Nirvana-and
of
that death instinct of which they are, in Freudian terms, the representatives, or, in Proustian terms, the angels-that
the second
goal of reading lies. If the pleasure which it brings is, above all, the
jubilation of a subject who transfers himself-and
possesses
himself-in
an imaginary ego and world, that pleasure, on a
deeper level, is the happiness of a drift in which the subject flows,
losing himself beyond the images themselves. Much has been said
in recent years about an eroticism in reading. I would instead speak
of it as an annulment of eros, of everything that can lead us back to
exaltation and to life. 33Behind the mirror of the images, dissolving
the fantasies of the desire to which these images gave form, reading attracts us and urges us toward that place where there is
nothing more to desire because there is quite literally nothing. Or
rather, only Freud's "inorganic state." Or rather, the rock in
Ruskin's mine: rock with no gold left: mine which has closed in on
itself.
3. SEDUCTION

If this is the ultimate goal of reading, it seems reasonable now
to ask ourselves what textual strategies activate it. It is clear that the
discussion about reading must at some stage double into a discussion about the text. (The same way as in Barthes the distinction
between the pleasure of the text and the enjoyment of the text
corresponds to the distinction between text for pleasure and text
for enjoyment.) This will allow a further clarification of the concept
of (literary) seduction: this time a parte obiecti.And since this concept was introduced by Baudrillard, we must refer to him.
Baudrillard uses two definitions of seduction alternately and
not very precisely. On the one hand, he defines as seductive any
"intransitive" surface which does not refer to any depth below it,
but instead withholds the eye in itself and makes it circulate among
its forms (for example, make-up, fashion, games, ceremony, etc.).
If a reference is made to something other than the appearance, it is
only a simulation produced by the appearance itself-as in the
trompe-l'oeil (which is Baudrillard's standard example), where
three-dimensionality is simulated by two dimensions.
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On the other hand, however, Baudrillard states that the seductive mechanism "retracts something from the order of the visible,"34 it produces-or
rather, it bases itself upon an "eclipse of
presence." 35The surface includes the "shadow" areas-invisible,
unspoken-and
these are the priming areas for seduction. Baudrillard then goes to great length to deny that the "shadow" which is
drawn on the surface corresponds to a "back" of that surface: 36the
appearance is not perforated but simply obscured, and the fact that
the "shadow" is mistaken for a "back" is only the deceit (leurre)
which seduction consists of (as the trompe-l'oeilexample shows).
I do not intend to discuss this theory here. I cannot help
pointing out, however, that I find it more suggestive than
convincing-a verbal artifice of the same tenor as the "superficial
abyss" formula which Baudrillard adores. 37Not only does he continually presuppose that very depth he denies when he is explaining the seduction mechanism, 38 but in all the examples he offers
(the only exception being perhaps the trompe-l'oeil)this depth does
play a part. To prove this, we need only look at erotic seduction
(model for every other form of seduction): Baudrillard goes to great
desire and
length to separate it from sexuality-from
enjoyment-whereas
in actual fact it consists of and exists only in
reference to that sexuality. That is, in the reference to something
which is other than it and lies behind it. 39
I would consider important, instead, the emphasis placed on
the shadow, on the invisible and the unsaid. It is not what is
offered to the eye which is seductive, but what is removed from it.
As Barthes said (without, however, using this term), a striptease is
not seductive but the unbuttoning of a blouse is. 40What is seductive is that which cannot be perceived and deciphered-within
a
context of perceptibility and decipherability. 41"Seduction," writes
Baudrillard, "is always what outrages the visible universe [ ... ] in
order to overturn it into a secret; what seduces is something which
contains a great secret." 42 (I would note, by the way, that the
dimension of depth comes out again in these very words. It may
well be, in fact-as Baudrillard adds immediately after-that what
is seductive is "what contains" the secret and not "what is hidden''; but ''what contains'' the secret is seductive insofar as it refers
to "what is hidden" as to something other than itself.)
If this is seduction, it must be carefully distinguished from
fascination. The contradictoriness of Baudrillard's theory derives
from his having confused the two concepts. 43Though I don't have
the time (nor indeed would it be the appropriate place) to attempt
to elaborate on this, I will simply point out that everything Baudrillard writes about appearance pertains to fascination, not to seduc -
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tion. Fascination is the abrupt halt before an impenetrable surface.
It i·s the experience of pure, absolute visibility, the experience of a
flat shape devoid of all depth. What is fascinating, then, is everything which is pro-duced in the exact sense in which Baudrillard
uses the term: "brought to visibility. " 44 Everything which does not
contain a secret.
Seduction, on the contrary, begins precisely where the secret
begins. Where the surface of the visible, of the said, bends over and
sinks into a whirlpool which sucks in the subject (spectator or
reader) toward something which is-and must remain-hidden.
Baudrillard is perfectly correct in saying that the true secret is the
one which remains such, which (since it is different from the
enigma) cannot or must not ever be revealed. 45 But precisely for
this reason it seduces: because it makes the subject experience a
feeling of vertigo which projects him outside of himself.
It is clear that we are not far from the discussion on reading
already developed. The two goals of the imaginary appropriation
of the self and of the world and of their expropriation correspond,
in fact, to the experiences of fascination and seduction-two
experiences which are both textual strategies. The literary text fascinates in that it offers the reader a surface of shapes, of figures over
which his eyes can run (and I need not add that the more the
surface of the text is perfected, the more it will fascinate, as in the
well -known example of entertainment literature). And since fascination is always an identification (-alienation) in the image displayed, the reader will appropriate to himself what the surface of
the text shows him. The text, on the other hand, seduces to the
extent that, by referring the reader toward "something" which it
does not show him, toward a sense which is always removed from
him, it attracts him into a void which expropriates him of his
knowledge and of his very identity.
I foresee the objection that this void, the obscure depth of the
text, is precisely what gives rise to analysis and interpretation ,
which are anything but an expropriation of the subject. But I would
reply that with analysis and interpretation we are already at a
different level, subsequent to that reading. Analysis and interpretation are indeed the re-affirmation of the ego of the reader, who
has become critic, against the seductive effect produced in him by
the text and consisting, I repeat, of an eclipse of the ego - as the
page from Ruskin which I quoted at the beginning illustrates so
well. When, faced with what he called the "cruel reticence" of an
author, Ruskin confessed to "not understanding," he was registering perfectly (even if, certainly, involuntarily) the seductiveness
that the author had exerted on him. A bewilderment-to
adapt
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Barthes's words to Ruskin 46 -which had unsettled his historical,
cultural and psychological assumptions, the consistency of his
taste and values, upsetting not only his knowledge but his very
relationship with language. The experience, in short, of a loss
of self.
Someone may still object that the sensation of vertigo when
faced with the secret to which the text refers is something different
from the instance of drift which I mentioned above with reference
to reading. It seems to me, instead, that, as erotic seduction is the
activation of a desire in the subject who is seduced, so the secret
contained in the text activates in the reader precisely that tendency
to annul himself of which I have spoken and without which,
perhaps, he would not even read.
I would like to add one last thing. To say that the most seductive texts are those which most include a layer of things left unsaid
undoubtedly sounds obvious today. But it is something obviouslike all the emphasis on analysis and interpretation which accompanies it-which remains inside that myth (or ideology) of production so well illustrated, as far as sexuality is concerned, by
Foucault in La volontede savoirand against which Baudrillard himself has written so effectively. According to this myth (or ideolog y),
literature is born from a wish to say all. One writes in orderto say
everything. And if one does not say it, it is because one is not able,
because something prevents communication. Reticence, then, is
only the obstruction of the word, the unsaid , the interdiction of
something which asks only to be said, the secret , the effect of a
censorship (internal or external) .... Indeed, it is not even correct
that one cannot say (almost) everything; one can-obliquely,
through symbols and enigmas, through tropes and lapsus-which
analysis and interpretation will then undertake to solve, to translate into direct language, to communicate, using an inquisitorial
procedure for which the psychoanalysts who have studied the
secret have rightly used the expression "sublimated sadism." 47
Nothing must remain unspoken and hidden, every dark corner
must be lit, one must confess the unconfessed (or have it confessed), display the repressed, denounce the ignored .... Hiding is
an anathema, and silence is a curse.
And yet, what if we were to begin looking at literature (also)
from the opposit e point of view? In a recent book, The Genesisof
Secrecy(1979), Frank Kermode took as his starting point the "scandalous" verses of the Gospel of Saint Mark (4:11-12) (verses which
Ruskin certainly had in mind when he wrote the passage quoted
above) in which Jesus says that he speaks in parables in order that
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those who "are without" may see but not perceive, hear but not
understand, "lest at any time they should be converted and their
sins should be forgiven them." In order that they should not perceive and und erstand, in order that nothing should be communicated to them! Kermode's book then carried on in a different
direction and did not really center on this tendency toward secrecy
and silence. But it is a central feature in the author who is quoted
perhaps more than any other in that book: Henry James. Several of
James's stories are built around a secret: not around a variety or a
depth of meaning such as we find in all the great authors , but
around something which is intentionally not said and must not be
known-a kind of "black hole" around which the constellation of
the text rotates. They are stories which can mainly be defined as
meta-narratives , since they dramatize the act and the status of
writing, but which we could also define as "meta-seductive," since
what they present is precisely the effect of seduction which literature, through the secret it contains, exercises over the reader.
Predictably enough, critics have unleashed their "will to know" on
these stories: it was compulsory to reveal the secret, to make the
silence speak - where what James was evoking was the exact opposite: the function that hiding and keeping silent have for literature, and without which literature would not even exist, because
then it would be (as Ruskin had said) a "talking thing" and not a
"written thing ."
Communication in the bosom of silence is what Proust called
reading. Why not say, instead , that literature is silence in the
bosom of communication? Not the language of silence, but silence
in language (that is, in the only place where it is possible). Literature's appeal lies in this rejection of communication and displa y .
Psychoanalyst s will see in it the protection of the subject's identity.
Why not see, rather, the desire for its disappearance? So much has
been said (spoken,as always) of the liberating function of literature .
. . . Why not suppose, at least, that if it liberates us from something,
it is from ours elves?
EPILOGUE

This is, in my opinion - but I should really say, in my
experience-the heart of the literary experience. The rest comes
after-and
the "rest" is criticism, which begins with "knowing
how to read," with Barthes's "pleasure of the text," 48 and then
continues with hermeneutics and with historico-cultural reconstructions. At these various levels, criticism is always a compromise
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(in the sense in which Freud spoke of "compromise-formations")
between our ego and the world we go on living in, on the one hand,
and the experience of literature in the process of reading, on the
other. Criticism is a return of the ego to itself, which submits to its
own pow ers of recognition and control that text which, for a
moment, had made it come out of itself. It is a defensive strategy
against the seductive force of literature, and as such it is regulated
by the principle of reality, not of pleasure and /or death.
I hope it is clear that I say all this without any derogatory
intention. Criticism is something we all do, which I myself do. It is
not a futile or useless exercise, or only a job which we are paid for.
Criticism gives us an awareness of the literary fact, of its historical
and cultural collocation, of the functions it performs each time, of
the values it produces and reproduces, of the rules which govern it .
. . . But the knowledge of a fact is not the experience of it.
If I may take up the metaphor of the mine again for the last
time, the critic seems to me to be like the mine engineer who, after a
preliminary study of the land, digs a well and the tunnels, provides
ventilation and safety systems, and if he goes into the shafts, it is
only to put a prop here, a beam there, a vent somewhere else something quite different from going alone into the darkness of the
earth. And yet this going-in is what constitutes the experience of
the mine.
Similarly, criticism is the drilling and the exploitation of literature, the extraction of what the "world above" defines as the gold
of knowledge. But this work and its proceeds remain outside of
that for which I can find no other name except, once again, the
experience of literature. The critic is Rosso Malpelo who has come
back among men , and has perhaps become manager of the mine.
Perhaps it was impossible for him not to come back-but if he
forgets "what it was like in there," if he does not use it as a t:onstant
reference point for his every choice and action, then he might as
well change his job.
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